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INTRODUCTION 
Over the period 2002 to 2010, Statistics New Zealand carried out a longitudinal survey known as the 
Survey of Family, Income and Employment (SoFIE). Some eight waves of data were collected. In 
every second wave (2003/2004, 2005/2006, 2007/2008 and 2009/2010), respondents were asked 
questions about their wealth holdings. 
In 2007 Statistics New Zealand published a paper by Jit Cheung, ‘Wealth Disparities in New Zealand’, 
based on data from wave 2 (2003/2004). This paper provided an overview of net worth disparity, 
giving information by mean and by median, and other distribution information including the Gini 
coefficient and other percentile-based information. Results were also analysed by age, by major 
ethnic group, by family type, and also by gender, personal income decile, and region.  
In November 2015, we published a paper, ‘Wealth Disparities in New Zealand: Preliminary Report 
Providing Updated Data from SOFIE’ (IGPS working paper 15/02), which updated the Cheung 2007 
paper to include data from waves 4, 6 and 8 of SoFIE. 
As promised in that paper, we have now extended our research on wealth disparities by using the 
SoFIE data to investigate two further areas: 
1. In Part 1, a longitudinal analysis looking at the extent to which survey respondents in specified 
wealth sub-divisions moved between such sub-divisions over the course of the survey; and 
2. In Part 2, an asset class analysis looking at how wealth holdings across the spectrum are divided 
among the different classes, for both assets and liabilities. 
Note that the results presented here for wave 2 differ a little from the original results owing to 
changes made to SoFIE population weightings after 2007.  
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PART 1: LONGITUDINAL ANALYSIS 
1. DATA 
In this first part of the analysis, we are interested in what the data tells us about the mobility over 
time between different wealth groups. The approach taken here is a “first cut” – as with much 
research, it provides some partial answers, but also raises further questions.  
We began by dividing the wave 8 (2009/2010) respondents into net worth quintiles (a ‘quintile’ 
representing one-fifth of the population), with quintile 1 the lowest fifth, and quintile 5 the highest. 
Quintiles were chosen as being reasonably broad groups, and finer division (into deciles or tenths, 
for example) was not anticipated to provide a great deal more information, particularly through the 
middle of the distribution. We then ascertained, for each quintile, which quintile the respondent had 
been in wave 6, in wave 4, and in wave 2.  
We repeated this exercise for the wave 6 respondents, ascertaining which quintile the wave 6 
respondents had been in wave 4 and in wave 2 according to their wave 6 group. Finally, we 
ascertained the movement between quintiles according to position in wave 4 and wave 2. 
The results consist of 5 by 5 matrices, where a cell in row x and column y of the matrix contains the 
percentage of the end wave that is now in quintile x and had been in quintile y. We denote the 
matrices as MES, where E indicates the “end” quintile, and S the “starting” quintile. The process 
described above allows us to generate matrices M86, M84, M82, M64, M62, and M42, covering 
every possible combination of waves. For example, the cell in the 4th row and third column of M82 
shows as a percentage how many of those in the 4th quintile in wave 8 had been in the 3rd quintile in 
wave 2. 
To examine demographic effects, wave 8 respondents were further subdivided according to gender, 
household type, age, and ethnicity, and the process above repeated. Here the sub-groups were not 
necessarily 20% of the overall population; for example, those of European ethnicity in wave 8 made 
up around 32% of quintile 5 (the highest) and around 16-18% in each of the four lower quintiles. In 
some cases, such as higher quintiles for those aged 15-30, there were insufficient numbers for a 
percentage to be reported and results were suppressed. Nonetheless, we were generally able to 
review how movement between quintiles from one wave to another progressed over time, making 
adjustments as required and noted further below.  
In section 2 we consider the results for all respondents, looking mainly at the probability of members 
of a particular quintile in a particular wave remaining in that quintile from one wave to another, and 
what inferences we can draw from those results. 
In section 3 we look at results for the subdivided groups. In this latter case, we have focused on how 
the distribution of members of a given sub-group (such as Maori, or people aged 30-44) has changed 
over the six-year period covered by the four waves. We also discuss the extent to which the pattern 
of transfers between quintiles from wave 2 to wave 8 for the sub-groups differs from the wider 
pattern for all respondents. 
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2. ALL RESPONDENTS 
The initial position is a matrix as follows: 
TABLE 1.1: INITIAL MATRIX 
Start Q Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
End Q M88/M66/M44/M22 
Q1 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Q2 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 
Q3 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 
Q4 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 
Q5 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
 
If there were no mobility between quintiles over time, then all MES matrices would remain the same 
as this; each quintile would remain unchanged in membership. If on the other hand there were 
complete mobility, then over enough time, one would see all the table cells tending to 20%, since 
the probability of a respondent being in any particular quintile would be the same. These are of 
course the two possible extremes, and neither is likely.  
At the very least, some movement between quintile boundaries must be expected, since a 
respondent close to a boundary might easily cross over with little change in net worth. Movement 
from the three central quintiles can occur across both upper and lower boundary; for the highest 
quintile, movement can only be down, and for the lowest quintile, movement can only be up. A 
priori, movement out of the central quintiles would therefore be expected to be rather higher than 
out of the two end quintiles. 
The results in respect of movement over two years, matrices M86, M64, and M42, are shown below. 
TABLE 1.2: PERCENTAGE MOVEMENT OVER TWO YEARS 
Start Q Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
End Q M86 M64 M42 
Q1 71% 21% 4% 3% 2% 69% 21% 6% 3% 1% 70% 21% 5% 2% 2% 
Q2 19% 52% 19% 7% 3% 19% 53% 19% 6% 4% 21% 54% 17% 6% 3% 
Q3 5% 18% 51% 19% 7% 6% 18% 50% 21% 6% 4% 20% 52% 20% 6% 
Q4 3% 6% 19% 54% 18% 2% 7% 20% 53% 19% 2% 4% 21% 53% 21% 
Q5 2% 3% 7% 17% 71% 3% 2% 7% 17% 71% 2% 3% 7% 21% 69% 
 
The pattern is broadly similar for each two year period: 
 For the three middle quintiles, a little over half remain in the same quintile, about 20% move up 
or down to the quintile on either side over the two years, and another 10% move more than one 
quintile; and 
 For the end quintiles, around 70% remain, about 20% have moved down or up as the case may 
be over the two years to the next quintile, and the remainder move into the next three quintiles. 
The results in respect of movement over four years, matrices M84 and M62, are shown in Table 1.3. 
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TABLE 1.3: PERCENTAGE MOVEMENT OVER FOUR YEARS 
Start Q Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
End Q M84 M62 
Q1 65% 25% 6% 3% 1% 65% 23% 7% 2% 2% 
Q2 22% 46% 21% 8% 4% 22% 46% 20% 8% 4% 
Q3 6% 18% 46% 22% 8% 7% 21% 42% 20% 9% 
Q4 3% 7% 21% 50% 19% 3% 6% 23% 47% 21% 
Q5 3% 4% 7% 18% 68% 2% 4% 7% 22% 65% 
 
The M84 and M62 matrices are similar, and compared to the two-year results in Table 1.2, show 
only some further diminution of the original quintiles, and a slighter increase in the cross-boundary 
movement 
Table 1.4 shows the average of the two-year matrices M86, M64 and M42; the average of the four-
year matrices M84 and M62; and the M82 matrix. 
TABLE 1.4: AVERAGE PERCENTAGE MOVEMENT OVER TWO AND FOUR YEARS AND PERCENTAGE 
MOVEMENT OVER SIX YEARS  
Start Q Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
End Q Average M86/M64/M42 - two years Average M84/M62 – four years M82 – six years 
Q1 70% 21% 5% 3% 2% 65% 24% 6% 3% 2% 62% 26% 7% 3% 2% 
Q2 20% 53% 18% 6% 3% 22% 46% 20% 8% 4% 24% 43% 20% 9% 4% 
Q3 5% 19% 51% 20% 6% 7% 20% 44% 21% 8% 8% 21% 41% 20% 10% 
Q4 2% 6% 20% 53% 19% 3% 7% 22% 49% 20% 4% 6% 25% 44% 21% 
Q5 2% 3% 7% 18% 70% 3% 4% 7% 20% 66% 2% 4% 7% 24% 63% 
 
Again, observations for a six-year period show a slight further diminution of the original quintiles, 
and an even slighter increase in the cross-boundary movement, for six years of observation 
compared to four years. This suggests a degree of stickiness in quintile percentages, rather than fully 
free movement, but to confirm this, a check can be made as follows. 
Looking at the two-year period average movement, the left hand table of Table 1.4, 70% of those 
who started in Q1 remained; 20% moved up into Q2 after two years, and so on. Of those who 
started in Q2, 21% moved down into Q1, 53% remained in Q2, 19% moved up into Q3, and so on.  
Were these percentages expected to represent the movement for a further two years, we would 
expect Q1 after four years to contain: 
 The 70% of starting Q1 respondents at the two-year point would be subject to a 70% further 
decrease, i.e. 49% of the original starting respondents; 
 The 20% of starting Q1 respondents now in Q2 would be subject to a 21% movement back to Q1, 
i.e. 4.2% of starting Q1 respondents back to Q1; 
 The 5% of starting Q1 respondents now in Q3 would be subject to a 5% movement back to Q1, 
i.e. 0.25% of starting Q1 respondents back to Q1; 
 The 2% of starting Q1 respondents now in Q4 would be subject to a 3% movement back to Q1, 
i.e. 0.06% of starting Q1 respondents back to Q1; and 
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 The 2% of starting Q1 respondents now in Q5 would be subject to a 2% movement back to Q1, ie 
0.04% of starting Q1 respondents back to Q1. 
In total this gives 54% remaining in Q1 after four years, whereas the average shown in the middle 
table in Table 1.4 shows a much higher 65%. Carrying out the exercise above for all quintile 
positions, we get the following comparison: 
 TABLE 1.5: AVERAGE PERCENTAGE MOVEMENT OVER TWO YEARS, PREDICTION BASED ON 
PERCENTAGES, AND ACTUAL FOR FOUR YEARS’ MOVEMENT  
Start Q Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
End Q Average M86/M64/M42 - two years Predicted for four years Actual four-year average 
Q1 70% 21% 5% 3% 2% 54% 27% 11% 6% 4% 65% 24% 6% 3% 2% 
Q2 20% 53% 18% 6% 3% 25% 36% 22% 12% 7% 22% 46% 20% 8% 4% 
Q3 5% 19% 51% 20% 6% 10% 22% 34% 23% 12% 7% 20% 44% 21% 8% 
Q4 2% 6% 20% 53% 19% 5% 11% 23% 36% 25% 3% 7% 22% 49% 20% 
Q5 2% 3% 7% 18% 70% 5% 6% 13% 24% 54% 3% 4% 7% 20% 66% 
NB: Predicted results use percentages to five decimal places. 
This confirms the intuition that movement between quintiles is confined to only a portion of 
respondents. Carrying out the exercise with six-year period results shows a similar position. 
In summary, therefore, the results from two, three and four waves show some increase in 
dispersion, but much less than would result from movement between quintiles being the effect of 
totally random influences.  To focus on the main characteristics, and ignoring the movements over 
more than one boundary, these results can be summarised as follows. 
TABLE 1.6: PERCENTAGE OF QUINTILE MOVING OVER BOUNDARY: 2, 4, 6 YEARS 
  Two years Four years Six years 
  Down Stay Up Down Stay Up Down Stay Up 
Q1 -  70% 20%  - 65% 22%  - 62% 24% 
Q2 21% 53% 19% 24% 46% 20% 26% 43% 21% 
Q3 18% 51% 20% 20% 44% 22% 20% 41% 25% 
Q4 20% 53% 18% 21% 49% 20% 20% 44% 24% 
Q5 19% 70% -  20% 66% -  21% 63%  - 
 
With just three data points per quintile for the percentage remaining in the quintile, projection 
forward is necessarily subjective. There does, however, appear to be a diminishing decay, and hence 
it seems reasonable to consider a power series.  Averaging the top and bottom quintiles gives an 
equation y=.7032*x^-.104, and averaging the three central quintiles gives y=.5253*x^-.191.  
Projected to 10 observations, i.e. forward by 20 years, this suggests something like 55% of the top 
and bottom quintile respondents not moving over two decades, and 35% of the three central 
quintile respondents not moving. 
Beyond 20 years, some further decay is predicted by this power series, but its applicability will 
diminish over time, not the least as respondents age. What we can say with some certainty is that 
there is evidence of movement back and forth across quintile boundaries, but also that there is a 
substantial core that does not move; the rich, as well as the poor, are always with us. 
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3. GROUPING BY AGE, ETHNICITY, HOUSEHOLD TYPE, AND GENDER 
Overview 
For each group, a table was constructed of the percentage of each sub-group in each quintile in each 
wave. For instance, in the first table below, around 75% of respondents aged 15-30 were in the 
poorest fifth of all respondents in wave 2, but this had decreased to just over 60% by wave 8. 
Where the total did not add up to 100%, due to some cells being suppressed through insufficient 
data for anonymization criteria to be met, results were pro-rated if possible, or otherwise excluded. 
For each such table a graph has been constructed. The quintile marker, 20%, with which all the bars 
would line up if the distribution of the sub-group was uniform over the wealth spectrum, is shown as 
a blue line. 
To compare sub-group transfers between quintiles over the full six-year period for sub-groups, the 
difference from the reference position for all respondents (“the average”) was calculated. Some 
comment on these is included (except in the case of the Gender group, where differences were 
negligible), although none of the results were especially significant. 
It is worth noting that an increase in the number of respondents in, say, the poorest quintile may not 
indicate that they have become actually poorer but simply that their wealth has grown less quickly 
(relatively, in other words) than that of other groups. 
Age 
 
The sub-group age 15-30 shows 
respondents principally clustered within 
quintile 1, which is not surprising as at this 
age they are on the whole unlikely to hold 
much wealth, other than by inheritance 
(with some possible exceptions). The extent 
is greatest in wave 2, and by wave 8 there 
has been movement out of quintile 1 into 
quintiles 2 and 3, again as one would expect 
as respondents age. 
 
 
0 20 40 60 80
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q5
Age 15-30
Wave 2 Wave 4 Wave 6 Wave 8
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This next sub-group shows greater than 20% 
of respondents consistently in quintiles 2 and 
3, again not surprisingly. The proportion in 
quintile 1 drops marginally from wave 2 to 
wave 8, whereas it drops more obviously for 
quintile 2 over the same period. There is little 
change in proportions for quintile 3, but an 
increase in the proportions in quintiles 4 and 
5. 
 
 
 
The proportion of respondents in the higher 
quintiles increases for this age group, as 
expected. There appears however to be 
slightly more movement out of the fourth 
quintile than movement into the fifth 
quintile here; there is also a small increase in 
the proportion in the lowest quintile over 
the six years. 
 
 
 
 
For the oldest age group some fall-off in 
wealth might be expected, and this appears 
to be the case here. Although generally 
over-represented in the two highest 
quintiles, this group shows a falling-off of 
proportions in the highest quintile between 
wave 2 and wave 8, and an increase in the 
proportion in the lower quintiles. 
Interestingly, proportions in the middle 
quintile appear static. 
 
 
Turning to the characteristics of movement between quintile between wave 2 and wave 8 for the 
age sub-groups, the only notable points here look to be fewer respondents in the age 30-45 sub-
group remaining in quintile 1 over the period than the average, and a tendency in the over-60 sub-
0 10 20 30 40
Q1
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Q4
Q5
Age 45-60
Wave 2 Wave 4 Wave 6 Wave 8
0 10 20 30 40
Q1
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Age 60+
Wave 2 Wave 4 Wave 6 Wave 8
0 10 20 30 40
Q1
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Q3
Q4
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Age 30-45
Wave 2 Wave 4 Wave 6 Wave 8
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group for movement up a quintile to be consistently less than the average, in conjunction with a 
slight tendency for movement down a quintile to be marginally higher than average. This 
corresponds with an intuition that the youngest group will increase their comparative wealth 
holdings, and that the oldest group will run theirs down.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ethnicity 
 
 
The European subgroup is numerically the 
largest of the ethnicity sub-groups by a large 
margin, and hence it is unsurprising that 
there is not much difference between 
quintiles, nor between waves. One may at 
most note a slight decrease in the proportion 
in quintile 1 and increase in quintile 2 over 
the six years between waves. 
 
 
 
0 10 20 30 40
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q5
European
Wave 2 Wave 4 Wave 6 Wave 8
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For Maori, under-representation at the 
higher quintiles is not a surprise, but 
interestingly there is little movement in 
proportions over the 4 waves. For the 3rd and 
2nd quintiles however there is a diminution in 
the proportion over the period, and a 
marked increase in the proportion in the 
bottom quintile. All other things being equal, 
this may indicate some worsening of 
comparative wealth holdings by Maori. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The position for the Pacifica sub-group is 
similar to that of Maori.  
 
 
 
 
The position shown for the Asian sub-group 
is next to no change in the (over-
represented) bottom quintile proportions, 
but some slight increase in the top quintile 
proportion along with a decrease in the 
quintile 2 proportions. The indication would 
seem to be that the fall in quintile 2 is 
matched by increases in quintile 5, and to a 
lesser extent, quintile 3.  
 
 
 
In summary, the Maori and Pacifica sub-groups both show greater than average proportions 
remaining put in the bottom quintile than the overall average, and greater than average moving 
0 10 20 30 40
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down across boundaries for quintile 2, especially Pacifica. The Asian sub-group shows consistent 
lower than average remaining in quintiles 2 to 5, but mostly higher movement up out of quintiles. 
 
Household type 
 
The couple-only sub-group graph shows 
some similarity to the age 60+ graph, as 
might be expected; there is likely, however, 
to have been some respondents in the age 
15-30 sub-group, increasing the proportions 
in the lower quintiles. As with the age 60+ 
sub-group, there is a lower proportion in 
quintile 5 by wave 8 than at the start. Except 
for some increase in the proportion in 
quintiles 3 and 2 by the end, though, there is 
not a great deal of movement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is not much evidence for this sub-
group of movement in proportions in each 
quintile over the period, except possibly 
some increase in the proportion in the fifth 
quintile and some movement out of the 
second quintile.  
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The sub-group of one-parent families with 
a child or children shows over-
representation in the lower quintiles as 
expected. There is a minor increase in the 
bottom quintile over the period, and a 
decrease in the second quintile, suggesting 
perhaps a worsening of position. 
Proportions in the higher quintiles appear 
stable. 
 
 
 
 
 
There are not a lot of respondents in this 
category, and hence variable results from 
wave to wave are to be expected. Absent 
the shortfall in quintile 3 and excess in 
quintile 1 for wave 8, the results for this 
sub-group seem remarkably uniform.  
 
 
 
In summary, for the couple-only sub-group 
there is a markedly lower percentage remaining in quintile 1 than average. The not-in-family sub-
group shows some general variability from the standard, but this may be the result of small numbers 
of respondents in this sub-group. 
 
Gender 
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Not in family
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The graphs indicate some minor differences in distribution. Males are slightly over-represented in 
the top quintile, quintile 5, and under-represented in quintile 2, and conversely for females. There 
has been very little difference in the proportions over the four waves. 
 
Summary 
The results shown here for groups mostly confirm what would be expected in terms of the 
distribution of net worth in the various sub-groups. Older people have more wealth, but the very 
oldest have slightly down-sized over the period. Perhaps less expected is that the downsizing seems 
concentrated into the lowest quintile, rather than more evenly. Maori and Pacifica both show a 
falling-off of proportions in quintile 2 and an increase in quintile 1, while proportions in the higher 
quintiles are relatively stable. This pattern also shows up with the household type sub-group one 
parent with child(ren). Couples with children appear more stable, suggesting that child poverty in 
one-parent families requires particular attention.   
 
 
4. DISCUSSION 
The period over which the SoFIE survey was taken, 2002 to 2010, included the 2008 financial crisis, 
and is in any case too short for any strong conclusions to be made as to mobility within relative 
wealth holdings. However, tentatively one can observe: 
 There is clearly some movement in relativities occurring, and the movement between quintile 
boundaries is clearly more than would happen for very small changes in relative wealth 
 However, there appears to be a core within each quintile which does not move; there are 
insufficient waves to reach a firm conclusion, but from the three data points available 
(movement from wave 2 to wave 4, from wave 4 to wave 6, and wave 6 to wave 8), the data is 
suggestive of something like 55% of those in the top and the bottom quintile not moving, and 
the position of about a third of those in the three middle quintiles remaining unchanged. 
0 10 20 30 40
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This could be interpreted as indicating at least some rigidity in relative wealth holdings; while a 
reasonable number of people are able to improve their standing relative to others, there is a solid 
core, both at the top end and at the bottom end, who appear not to change. From a social cohesion 
perspective, this may be a cause of some concern. Some research into the drivers of these results 
would appear desirable; what is holding back the poorest from improving their wealth, and are there 
anti-competitive mechanisms which allow the wealthy to maintain their wealth, for example. 
Demographic characteristics will naturally have an impact on results. The analysis by demographic 
characteristics does not provide any real surprises: 
 Increase in age is associated with increased wealth, and at the oldest age there is some fall-off 
over time in relative position (although the movement seems to be from the top to the bottom 
quintile to a larger extent than one might expect) 
 In terms of ethnicity, Maori and Pasifica show some deterioration in relative wealth, with more 
in the bottom quintile by the end of the survey; however, although those in the top quintile are 
under-represented in terms of the whole population, there appears to be little movement in 
their relative position over time 
 Those of Asian ethnicity are showing movement from being in the second to bottom quintile 
into the three upper quintiles, while there is stability in the bottom quintile; this may be the 
result of differences of composition in this population 
 The one parent with child group shows movement in relative standing very similar to that of 
Maori and Pacifica 
 There is no significant movement in the wealth distribution by gender over the period, with 
males continuing to be a little wealthier than females 
The similarity between results for Maori and Pasifica on the one hand and one parent households on 
the other is unlikely to be a coincidence, and may be evidence that more support for one parent 
households will also improve some of the differences shown based on ethnicity.  
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PART 2: ASSET CLASSES 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In our first paper (IGPS working paper 15/02), we analysed the distribution of net worth in New 
Zealand, replicating Cheung’s 2007 analysis of how wealth is divided among the wealthiest 1%, the 
next 4%, and so on. This distribution is interesting for reasons relating to the role of wealth in 
determining individual well-being, the implications of wealth concentrations for democracy and 
urban form, and the long-term dynamics of wealth and inequality discussed by Thomas Piketty.1 
 
However, this analysis does not tell us much about the characteristics of that wealth – in particular, 
the kinds of asset classes in which it is held. This is relevant because different asset holdings have 
different implications for individual well-being and social dynamics. A concentration of asset 
holdings in housing, for instance, may indicate a tax bias towards housing investment and a 
distortion away from more productive investment in other areas. Holdings of assets beyond housing, 
in contrast, indicate the extent to which households have liquid assets that could be used to 
generate further opportunities. 
 
To that end, this paper analyses the wealth holdings of individuals in SoFIE’s wave 8 (2009/10). It 
does this by looking at wealth holdings both broken down by different groups and across the whole 
population. In addition, some descriptive material is presented on the boundaries between different 
groups, showing how much is required to be a member of a given wealth group. There is also a brief 
discussion of the asset holdings of the wealthiest 1%. 
 
2. ASSET HOLDINGS – WHOLE POPULATION 
Assets and liabilities in SoFIE were reported in 15 classes for assets and seven for liabilities, as 
follows: 
 
Asset code   Description  
TrustAss   Assets placed in trusts of which the respondent was a beneficiary 
OwnHome   The respondent’s own home 
ResProp (excluding own home) Property investments excluding the respondent’s own home 
CredCardAss   Positive credit card balances 
BankAccAss   Positive bank account balances 
MvAss    Motor vehicles  
LeisAss    Leisure and sports equipment 
HHItems   General household items such as furniture 
SuperAss   Superannuation assets, including KiwiSaver and pensions 
LifeIns    Life insurance policies 
BusinessAss   Equity in companies controlled by the respondent 
FinAss    Financial assets in the form of shares, bonds and other instruments 
CashAss   Cash on hand 
CollAss    Collectables such as artworks 
OthAss    All other assets 
 
 
                                                             
1 For a discussion of these issues, see Max Rashbrooke, Wealth and New Zealand, Bridget Williams Books, 
Wellington, 2015. 
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Liability code   Description 
MortDebt   Mortgage debt 
CredCardDebt   Credit card debt 
BankAccDebt   Bank overdrafts  
BankLoan   Bank loans for purposes other than mortgages 
StudLoan   Student loan value 
HPDebt    Hire purchase debt 
OtherDebt   All other debts 
 
Summary code   Description  
TotalAss   Total assets 
TotalLiab   Total liabilities 
NetWorth   Net Worth 
 
Table 2.1 below shows how the net worth of the New Zealand population was divided among these 
different asset and liability classes in wave 8. 
 
TABLE 2.1: ASSETS OF THE WHOLE POPULATION 
 
Code Mean 
($) 
Median 
($) 
Total ($ 
million) 
% of total 
Assets 
    
TrustAss 21,700 0 73,437 7.6 
OwnHome 103,300 0 349,753 36.3 
ResProp_excl_OwnHome 25,700 0 87,056 9.0 
CredCardAss 0 0 35 0.0 
BankAccAss 14,200 800 48,001 5.0 
MvAss 6,800 3,000 22,937 2.4 
LeisAss 3,000 0 10,003 1.0 
HHItems 32,300 25,000 109,328 11.3 
SuperAss 5,800 0 19,525 2.0 
LifeIns 7,500 0 25,484 2.6 
BusinessAss 53,200 0 180,165 18.7 
FinAss 9,300 0 31,612 3.3 
CashAss 0 0 153 0.0 
CollAss 900 0 2,970 0.3 
OthAss 900 0 3,174 0.3 
Liabilities     
MortDebt 35,500 0 120,253 81.2 
CredCardDebt 900 0 3,164 2.1 
BankAccDebt 1,800 0 5,928 4.0 
BankLoan 2,700 0 9,111 6.2 
StudLoan 2,100 0 7,252 4.9 
HPDebt 200 0 715 0.5 
OtherDebt 500 0 1,626 1.1 
TotalAss 284,700 153,800 963,630 100 
TotalLiab 43,700 3,000 148,049 100 
NetWorth 240,900 95,000 815,581 100 
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For assets, the largest item by far is the respondent’s own home, making up 36.3% of all gross 
assets. Combined with other investment in housing (9%), property makes up just over 45% of all 
assets. This is very close to the figure given in a similar survey in 2001, the Household Savings Survey 
(HSS), where property made up 46% of assets.2 It is considerably larger than investment in the next 
largest class, business assets, which make up 18.7%, or in financial assets, at 3.3%.  
 
This could be taken as supporting the arguments that New Zealanders over-invest in property, at the 
expense of investments regarded as being more productive, that is, contributing more to GDP 
growth.3 However, analysis of previous SoFIE data by Trinh Le et al argued that such levels of 
property investment were not unusual by international standards.4 
 
Other than general household assets (11.3%), the only other notable asset class is wealth held in 
trusts, at 7.6%. This is noteworthy because of long-standing concerns that trusts may be used to 
avoid tax or otherwise circumvent the law.5 The figure for wealth held in trusts, $73 billion, is lower 
than that reported in the HSS ($93 billion), but trust wealth is relatively difficult to estimate, and 
such figures should be treated with some caution. 
 
When it comes to liabilities, mortgage debt is by far the largest category, at 81.2%. Again, this is line 
with the HSS, and is to be expected, given the dominance of property as an asset class. 
 
 
3. ASSET HOLDINGS – BREAKDOWN  
 
Wealth holdings matter both for individuals and for society as a whole. Conceptually, while income 
allows individuals to make ends meet day-to-day or week-to-week, wealth allows for longer-term 
planning. Asset ownership allows individuals the security to plan for the future, confident that they 
have something to borrow against or use to ride out periods of low income. Asset ownership also 
provides people with a ‘stake’ in society, an effect seen, for instance, in the way that house owners 
are more committed to their local communities than renters.6 
 
At the social level, given the above arguments, it may be of concern if wealth – and ownership of 
particular types of asset – is highly concentrated at one end of the spectrum. Concentrations of 
wealth may also lead to some groups having greater influence on politics than others, and to 
neighbourhoods becoming increasingly stratified by wealth. Finally, ideas of a ‘stakeholder society’, 
in which ownership of the economy is believed to be widely shared, are sometimes invoked, for 
instance in support of policies such as the recent sell-off of stakes in New Zealand’s power 
companies. For that reason it is worth looking at how widely ownership of some asset classes is 
distributed. 
 
                                                             
2 Rashbrooke, Wealth and New Zealand, p.59. 
3 For arguments of this kind, see, for instance, Gareth Morgan, ‘New Zealand Income Tax: Unfair and favours 
the rich’, Morgan Foundation, Wellington, June 2016, available at: http://morganfoundation.org.nz/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/CCIT_V16.pdf (accessed 27 June 2016). 
4 Trinh Le, John Gibson and Steven Stillman, ‘Household Wealth and Saving in New Zealand: Evidence from the 
Longitudinal Survey of Family, Income and Employment’, Motu Working Paper 10-06, Wellington, September 
2010, p.8. 
5 Rashbrooke, Wealth and New Zealand, pp.73-74. 
6 Ibid., pp.22-25. 
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The net worth deciles 
 
For this analysis, the population is divided into deciles (groups of ten) by net worth, with 
characteristics as set out in Table 2.2, which for each decile gives the mean and median value, the 
total net worth, and the net worth of the individual at the upper and lower bound. The latter figures 
show how much is needed for an individual to gain entry to a given decile. Figures are not available 
in some categories because of Statistics New Zealand data restrictions, as publishing these figures 
could compromise the privacy of individuals who took part in SoFIE. 
 
TABLE 2.2: THE NET WORTH DECILES – BOUNDARIES AND AVERAGES 
 
Decile Mean Median Minimum Maximu
m 
Total net worth 
1 -23,000 -6,500 - - -7,871,472,922 
2 3,200 3,000 - 6,300 1,057,312,420 
3 12,300 11,700 6,300 20,000 4,168,483,760 
4 32,000 31,600 20,000 46,500 10,851,799,283 
5 68,700 67,500 46,600 95,000 23,210,963,311 
6 124,800 124,200 95,100 157,700 42,237,654,088 
7 193,600 192,500 157,700 232,600 65,543,699,671 
8 280,600 279,800 232,600 334,000 94,973,768,669 
9 
428,300 420,500 334,100 552,800 
144,936,414,29
5 
10 
1,289,700 850,500 552,800 - 
436,471,879,50
6 
 
As Figure 2.1 below demonstrates, decile 1 is in net debt; after that mean net worth increases 
steadily across the spectrum before increasing sharply for the wealthiest decile. 
 
Figure 2.1 
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How different asset classes are distributed across the deciles 
 
Many of the asset class distributions match the pattern for overall wealth. Trust assets, for instance, 
are strongly concentrated among the wealthiest decile, which has a mean trust ownership of 
$155,000 and a total trust wealth of $52.6 billion. 
 
Figure 2.2 
 
 
 
Cash in the bank (Figure 2.3) follows a similar pattern, with negligible amounts for the poorer 
deciles, figures in the single thousands for the middle deciles, and a mean of $69,000 for decile 10. 
So too do the figures for collectables such as artworks (Figure 2.4), which, given their relatively small 
proportion of total wealth, are presented as totals for each decile rather than means, as is done for 
the other asset classes. The poorer deciles have virtually no collectables, whereas the wealthiest 
decile have $1.5 billion in this category between them. 
 
Figure 2.3 
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Figure 2.4 
 
 
 
However, not all kinds of assets are distributed in the same pattern. Housing wealth displays 
differing characteristics: own-home wealth is slightly more evenly distributed than other assets, 
reflecting the fact that home ownership is still relatively widespread (although falling in recent 
years); but significant ownership of rental and investment property is very much the preserve of the 
wealthiest 10%. 
 
Figure 2.5 
 
 
 
Business and financial assets are perhaps the most concentrated of all, however. Business assets, as 
Figure 2.5 shows, are highly concentrated in decile 10, where the mean value of $466,000 is ten 
times greater than that of the nearest decile. These assets are equity stakes in companies owned by 
the individual respondent. These figures may indicate that, despite high levels of small business 
ownership in New Zealand, significant wealth is generated only by a very small number of 
businesses. Financial assets, meanwhile, are investments – such as shares, bonds and other financial 
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instruments – in companies and other organisations not majority owned by the individual. They too 
are concentrated among the wealthiest decile, suggesting that, contrary to claims about the 
ownership society, significant share ownership is also relatively limited in its extent. 
 
Figure 2.6 
 
 
 
When it comes to liabilities, the patterns are strikingly different: liabilities do not increase steadily, 
let alone exponentially, with net worth. This partly explains why net worth increases so strongly 
across the spectrum. As Figure 2.6 shows, mean mortgage debt varies unpredictably across the 
deciles, with relatively little to distinguish decile 5 from decile 10, although deciles 2-4 have 
noticeably less in mortgage debt, perhaps reflecting falling home ownership in these classes as 
housing becomes increasingly expensive. The presence of relatively high mortgage debt in decile 1 
indicates that this decile may not be conventionally ‘poor’, as would be the case of decile 1 for 
income; some of its members may be high income earners borrowing large sums to buy a home. 
 
Figure 2.7 
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Two final liabilities charts present a yet more complex picture. Looking at credit card, bank 
overdraft, and loan values together (Figure 2.8), we see no clear pattern. Mean credit card debt is 
evenly distributed across the deciles, and in any case makes up just 2.1% of all liabilities (see above). 
Overdrafts and bank loans show no particular pattern, though they are more significant for deciles 9 
and 10 respectively. In Figure 2.9, meanwhile, we see that while hire purchase debt is fairly evenly 
distributed, student loan debt is highly concentrated in the poorest decile. 
 
Figure 2.8 
 
 
 
Figure 2.9 
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4. WEALTH AND POVERTY 
 
Another method of analysing wealth inequality is to contrast the fortunes of the poorest and 
wealthiest SoFIE respondents. This can be done by looking at the asset and wealth profile of the 
poorest decile and of the wealthiest 1%, which we have not previously looked at in detail. (This 1% 
sits within decile 10, and its figures are therefore a subset of those for that decile.) Their contrasting 
profiles are presented below in Table 2.3. These two groups are not directly comparable, as one 
represents one-hundredth of the population and the other represents one-tenth. Nonetheless it is 
instructive to consider how asset holdings vary at the opposite ends of the spectrum and draw some 
broad conclusions. 
 
Table 2.3 
 
The wealth of the 
wealthiest 1%     
   
Type Mean ($) Median ($) Total ($m) 
Assets    
Trusts 514,500 0 17,508 
Own home 473,100 150,000 16,101 
Property (other) 246,100 0 8,376 
Credit card 0 0 0 
Bank account 162,400 6,600 5,526 
Motor vehicles 22,900 15,000 779 
Leisure items 40,900 1,000 1,392 
Household items 91,400 56,300 3,110 
Superannuation 11,700 0 398 
Life insurance 42,100 0 1,431 
Business assets 2,670,300 2,000,000 90,877 
Financial assets 171,000 0 5,819 
Cash 300 0 11 
Collectables 10,400 0 356 
Other assets 34,700 0 1,180 
Liabilities    
Mortgage 138,900 0 4,728 
Credit card debt 1,200 0 40 
Overdraft 7,600 0 257 
Bank loan 6,200 0 213 
Student loan 0 0 0 
Hire purchase 0 0 2 
Other debt 0 0 0 
Total assets 4,491,700 3,412,000 152,864 
Total liabilities 154,000 1,000 5,240 
Total net worth 4,337,800 3,335,300 147,624 
 
The wealth of the poorest tenth   
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Type Mean ($) Median ($) Total ($m) 
Assets 
   
Trusts 1,400 0 479 
Own home 4,500 0 1,528 
Property (other) 700 0 226 
Credit card 0 0 0 
Bank account 1,200 0 401 
Motor vehicles 1,900 0 660 
Leisure items 600 0 221 
Household items 7,200 2,000 2,473 
Superannuation 800 0 278 
Life insurance 0 0 7 
Business assets 2,100 0 723 
Financial assets 400 0 128 
Cash 0 0 6 
Collectables 100 0 25 
Other assets 0 0 14 
Liabilities    
Mortgage 17,800 0 6,101 
Credit card debt 1,000 0 356 
Overdraft 3,700 0 1,262 
Bank loan 6,200 0 2,132 
Student loan 11,900 7,000 4,076 
Hire purchase 300 0 113 
Other debt 2,900 0 1,000 
Total assets 21,000 5,000 7,168 
Total liabilities 44,000 14,600 15,040 
Total net worth -23,000 -6,500 -7,871 
 
The mean assets of the wealthiest 1% are dominated by business assets, which at $2.67 million 
make up more than half the total, an extension of the concentration seen among decile 10. Also 
noticeable are high levels of trust assets (a mean of $514,000), own home wealth ($473,000), 
financial assets ($171,000) and cash in the bank ($162,000). These contribute to total gross assets of 
nearly $4.5 million. In contrast, liabilities are relatively low: around $150,000, almost all of it in 
mortgages. As a result, mean net worth is $4.3 million.  
 
In contrast, the poorest decile’s register is dominated by debt. Its total liabilities are over $15 billion, 
and its overall net worth position is -$7.9 billion. However, as discussed above, this does not imply 
that every member of this decile is poor in the sense of popular discourse – that is, experiencing a 
severely substandard way of life. The decile has nearly $1.8 billion in housing assets, albeit matched 
with $6.1 billion in mortgage debt, and $480 million in trust assets. Some $2.5 billion in household 
assets and other wealth adds up to $7.2 billion in total gross assets.  
 
In addition, the second largest class of debt is in student loans ($4 billion). While student loan debt 
can have negative effects on its possessors, it is also true that those with tertiary qualifications can 
expect to earn significantly more over their lifetimes than those without. These people are, 
therefore, less likely to remain lifetime poor or in debt, though some of course will. Some of this 
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debt may be regarded as investments in future prosperity, rather than debt incurred purely because 
of an inability to meet current needs – a form of debt generally regarded as more troubling. 
 
However, Table 2.3 also shows significant amounts of other forms of debt: $2.1 billion in bank loans, 
$1.3 billion in overdrafts, $360 million in credit card debt and $1 billion in ‘other’ debt, inter alia. 
This, on top of the student and mortgage debt, suggests very high levels of overall indebtedness, at 
least for some members of this decile. This also chimes with Reserve Bank figures showing that 
household debt is around 150% of income: overall New Zealand’s private debt levels are high, in 
contrast to our public (government) debt levels, which are low by international standards. 
 
5. DISCUSSION 
 
Our analysis shows sharp differences in the level and nature of wealth holdings across the spectrum. 
Other evidence shows that these trends are not unusual internationally; wealth is very unequally 
divided, and made up largely of housing, in most other developed countries. Yet these figures pose 
particular questions for a country that regards itself as particularly egalitarian, as New Zealand has 
done for much of its history. 
 
Our previous work has shown significant overall wealth inequality: the wealthiest 1% has 18% of all 
assets, and the wealthiest decile over half; in contrast the poorest half of the country has less than 
5%. This paper shows that only housing has a mildly equalising effect in terms of the asset 
distribution. Other asset classes, notably equity stakes in businesses, are very largely restricted to 
the wealthiest tenth. This fits with previous research on the subject.7 
 
This is relevant because it is the much higher levels of wealth, and ownership of financial and 
business assets, that are more likely to unlock the opportunities – such as business start-ups – that 
people need to achieve their life goals. Moreover, in the poorer deciles, the very small amounts of 
liquid assets, such as cash in bank accounts, indicate that many New Zealanders have little to draw 
on in case of major life shocks. There is little evidence to support the view that ownership of the 
economy is widely distributed. 
 
The high levels of debt in the poorest decile, which includes a wide range of different kinds of 
liabilities, may also raise concerns, given that debt is well-established as one of the major forces 
keeping people trapped in poverty (albeit, as noted above, that this finding will not apply to all 
respondents in the poorest decile). 
 
In many respects, our analysis chimes with a growing body of research. The country’s significant 
economic inequality – of income and of wealth – is not new; for income it has been present since the 
late 1980s, while for wealth it has presumably been in place almost as long. (We lack long-term data 
on this question.) But the growing public debate appears to be fed by concerns that these 
inequalities have strong social consequences, with those at one end of the spectrum having 
significantly more opportunities and advantages than others. Our findings suggest that these 
concerns may be justified. 
                                                             
7 Policy Advice Division of the Inland Revenue Department and the New Zealand Treasury, ‘The Taxation of 
Capital Gains: Background Paper for Session 3 of the Victoria University of Wellington Tax Working Group’, 
Wellington, September 2009, p.22.  
 
